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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20000813-CA

vs.
JON DONALD HAMLING
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a sentence for attempted possession of a controlled
substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (1999), in the Third
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court clearly err when it found that defendant, who had notice
of his sentencing hearing and was free to attend, was voluntarily absent?

Sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v.
Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991). Review of factual findings is for
clear error. See id. Whether a defendant has voluntarily absented himself is a
question of fact reviewed for clear error. See Johnson v. State, 604 S.W.2d 927,
929 (Ark. 1980) (finding of voluntary absence not "clearly wrong"); Frost v. United
States, 618 A.2d 653, 657 (D.C. 1992) (finding of voluntary absence not "clearly
erroneous"); cf State v. Reed, 992 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (review of
voluntary absence determination for abuse of discretion").
2. Should this Court adopt the novel rule, not asserted below, that a trial
court may not sentence a voluntarily absent defendant unless he was previously
warned that sentencing could proceed in his absence?
This is a question of law, and review is for correctness. Rhodes, 818 P.2d at
1049.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following provisions:
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2).
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally
present at the trial with the following exceptions:
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the
defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of
the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a
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verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if
defendant had been present; . . .
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)&(b).
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no
contest, the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be
not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless
the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders.
Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue
or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of
sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in
defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in
defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a
warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), a third degree felony, and with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor, both in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2), and booked into jail. R. 3, 11. Defendant pleaded guilty
to attempted possession of methamphetamine, a class A misdemeanor, on June 15,
2000; and the court dismissed the marijuana count. R. 20-29. The court accepted
the plea, notified defendant of his August 4 sentencing date, and released him to
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Pre-Trial Services. R. 26-30, 63:2-3. Defendant was released from custody on June
16,2000. PSIat4.
Defendant reported to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) for preparation of
his presentence investigation report (PSI). The report detailed an extensive history
of criminal activity associated with substance abuse and various other offenses,
including bail jumping. R. 62:4-6. It described a former probation terminated as
unsuccessful following an initial revocation, reinstatement, and subsequent failure to
report. R. 62:7. AP&P did not recommend probation. R. 62:13
Defendant did not appear for sentencing. R. 64:2-3. The court noted that it
had not had heard from defendant. R. 64:3-4. Defense counsel also had not heard
from defendant for at least two weeks. R. 64:4. The court found that defendant had
voluntarily absented himself, sentenced him in absentia to the statutory one-year
indeterminate term, and issued a bench warrant for his arrest. R. 33-39, 64:4.
Defense counsel then filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, concluding
with the following paradoxical prayer for relief: "Mr. Hamling requests that the
court correct [its] sentence and issue a bench warrant for his arrest allowing him to
address the court prior to being sentenced." R. 42. Although defendant still had not
appeared, defense counsel also requested a hearing on the matter. Id. The court
denied the motion without a hearing, reasoning "that without the defendant's
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personal appearance, such hearing [was] neither necessary nor warranted." R. 44,
46-47.
On August 31 defense counsel timely appealed defendant's conviction and the
court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. R. 62. According to the
district court docket, defendant was subsequently apprehended and booked on
October 11, 2000, more than two months after sentencing. Docket, Third District
Court-Salt Lake, Case No. 001909844, at 5 (attached in Addendum).1
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
According to the probable cause statement, a Salt Lake County sheriffs
detective observed what appeared to be a drug sale in a parking lot located at 4100
South Redwood Road. R. 4. The detective followed defendant, one of the
participants, when he left the area in a Ford Bronco. Id.
The detective then observed defendant, the driver and sole occupant of the
Bronco, stop his vehicle in a church parking lot, exit, remove his shirt, and place his
shirt inside the car. The detective contacted defendant and identified himself.
While speaking with defendant, the detective observed a plastic bag containing a tan
crystal substance lying on the car seat. Id.

!

The State requests that this Court take judicial notice of the trial court docket in
this case as permitted by Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Richie v. Richie,
784 P.2d 465, 468 (Ut. App. 1989) (court "may take judicial notice of the records and
prior proceedings in the same case"); Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.,
758 P.2d 451, 456 & n.4 (Ut. App. 1988) (court may take judicial notice on appeal).
5

The detective arrested defendant and retrieved the plastic bag, which fieldtested positive for methamphetamine. Id. The detective then searched the car and
located a container with a substance that appeared to be marijuana. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The trial court did not clearly err when it found that defendant's absence
was voluntary. Defendant had notice of the sentencing hearing and was free to
attend, in the sense that he was not incarcerated, but did not. Other evidence in the
record—both evidence before the court at the time of its ruling and evidence
developed subsequent to the ruling—supports this finding. Defendant did not, either
at sentencing or at any time after sentencing, proffer a reason for his absence.
2. Defendant did not raise the warning issue below and has not argued any
exception to the preservation requirement on appeal; this claim is therefore not
subject to review. In any event, the trial court has no affirmative duty to warn
defendants that they may be sentenced in absentia, and Utah law does not preclude
sentencing a voluntarily absent defendant in the absence of a warning. A defendant
who has notice and is free to attend waives his right to presence by his voluntary
absence.
ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the trial court violated Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure; Article I, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution; the Sixth
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Amendment; and due process by sentencing him in absentia. Br. Aplt. at 6. He
claims that "the record fails to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
right to presence." Br. Aplt. at 14. He further argues that a knowing and voluntary
waiver is impossible unless a trial court has warned a defendant that he can be
sentenced in his absence. Br. Aplt. at 7.
Point I
The trial court did not clearly err when it found
that defendant's absence from sentencing was voluntary.
Defendant states that the record does not establish a knowing and voluntary
waiver of his right to be present and defend at sentencing. Br. Aplt. at 14. In
support of that claim, defendant appears to argue that the record does not
demonstrate that he was voluntarily absent. See id. Defendant's argument on this
point is a challenge to the court's finding of fact, and appellate review is for clear
error.2 See Johnson v. State, 604 S.W.2d at 929; Frost v. United States, 618 A.2d
653, 657 (D.C. 1992).

2

Defendant argues that whether he was or was not voluntarily absent should be
reviewed for correctness and cites in support State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah App.
1996). Ham applies the correctness standard to the ultimate issue of whether consent to
search has been voluntarily given. Whether consent has been voluntarily given is not a
mere question of fact, i.e., of whether a defendant agreed to a search, but requires that the
court consider whether the defendant's agreement was sufficiently uncoerced to be
treated as legally voluntary. When reviewing the voluntariness of a consent to search, the
appellate court must balance "the legitimate need for such searches and the equally
important requirement of assuring an absence of coercion." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). Voluntariness in the context of a defendant's absenting
himself from trial, on the other hand, requires no review for coercion and no balancing of
competing interests. It is, rather, a mere factual inquiry.
7

The controlling case in this jurisdiction is State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107
(Utah 1996). In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court held that a defendant is
voluntarily absent when he is "free to attend" in the sense that he is "not
incarcerated elsewhere." Id, at 1110. Likewise, he must have notice of the
proceeding. Id.
The record in this case indicates that defendant had notice and was not
incarcerated. Defendant and his counsel both received notice of the sentencing date
and time at the plea hearing. R. 28:29, 63:3. As indicated in the PSI prepared three
days before trial, defendant had been released from custody on June 16, 2000. PSI
at 4. The trial court's finding that defendant was voluntarily absent is therefore not
clearly erroneous.
While notice and freedom from incarceration are sufficient to support the trial
court's finding of voluntariness, the finding is further supported by other evidence
before the trial court. Defendant had not contacted the court, nor had he contacted
his attorney regarding his absence. R. 64:3-4. Indeed, he had not contacted his
attorney during the two-week period prior to sentencing. Id. Further, while
defendant had appeared at AP&P for preparation of his PSI, the recommendation in
the PSI was unfavorable in that it recommended jail time, a possible explanation for
his failure to appear. PSI at 13. These factors all suggest a voluntary absence.
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Furthermore, in determining whether a defendant is voluntarily absent, this
Court has implicitly held that its review of a trial court's voluntariness decision may
extend to evidence developed subsequent to the trial court's ruling. See State v.
Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 988 (Ut. App. 1989) (reviewing affidavit filed with motion
for a new trial eight months after trial in absentia). This approach is also consistent
with the express holdings of other jurisdictions. Reasoning that the validity of a
trial court's voluntariness decision will be clearer in hindsight, these jurisdictions
hold that appellate courts may consider evidence not before the trial court. See, e.g.,
Moore, 670 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc). To exclude postruling evidence would make it difficult for a defendant to show involuntary absence
when moving to correct an illegal sentence. See id. Likewise, to preclude such
evidence would hinder an appellate court's ability to accurately review the trial
court's finding of voluntariness. See id.
In the instant case, post-sentencing entries in the district court docket
demonstrate that defendant made no effort to contact the court to explain his
absence. See Docket, Third District Court-Salt Lake, Case No. 001909844, at 5.
The docket shows only that defendant was finally apprehended and arrested on the
court's bench warrant over two months after sentencing. Id. Further, had defense
counsel discovered an explanation for defendant's absence, she could have
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requested the opportunity to present such evidence in her motion to correct an
illegal sentence. She did not. See R. 41-42.
Finally, Anderson implicitly holds that a defendant who has notice and is not
incarcerated carries the burden of proffering some "sound reason" to support a
contention that his absence was not voluntary. 929 P.2d at 1100; see also Wagstaff,
772 P.2d at 990) ("If [defendant's] absence is deliberate without a sound reason, the
trial court may start in his absence."). Anderson's implicit holding is consistent
with precedent in other jurisdictions expressly holding that a defendant, having
notice of his trial or sentencing proceeding and not incarcerated, has the burden of
at least proffering some evidence that his absence was involuntary. See United
States v. Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that where defendant
knew trial date and where no evidence suggested an enforced absence, defendant
"ha[d] the burden of going forward and offering evidence to refute the
[voluntariness] finding of the trial court"); State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270 (Minn.
1998) (holding that a "defendant bears the burden of showing that his or her
absence from trial was voluntary"); State v. Cotton, 621 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981) ("When a defendant is free on bond and does not appear at the time
specified, it is presumed, until established otherwise, that his absence is voluntary
for the purpose of deciding whether he has waived his right to be present at trial.");
Moore v. State, 670 S.W.2d at 261 ("Absent any evidence from defendant to refute
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the trial court's determination that his absence was voluntary, we will not disturb
the trial court's finding.").
In the instant case, defendant had notice and had been released from custody.
He did not, however, proffer any reason for his absence from sentencing. He did
not meet the burden of going forward to present some "sound reason" for his
absence.3
In sum, the trial court did not clearly err in finding defendant voluntarily
absent. The record demonstrates both that defendant had notice of sentencing and
that he was free to attend in the sense that he was not incarcerated. Other evidence
in the record at the time of sentencing, as well as evidence developed subsequently,
supports the trial court's finding. Finally, defendant did not, either at sentencing or
at any time thereafter, proffer a reason for his absence. Nothing in the record
suggests that defendant's absence was involuntary.

3

Pointing to statements made by defendant's sister in the PSI, defense counsel
suggests that defendant had emotional, mental health, and cognitive challenges that might
have interfered with his ability to keep appointments. Br. Aplt. at 4. Nothing in the
record suggests, however, that he missed his sentencing hearing because he was confused
about its date or time. Further, defendant timely appeared for his plea hearing and,
apparently, also for the appointment(s) with AP&P necessary for the preparation of his
PSI. See R. 28-29; 63; PSI at 8-11. Only after AP&P recommended jail time did
defendant fail to keep appointments.
11

Point II
A trial court may sentence a voluntarily absent defendant even though
he has not been warned that sentencing may proceed in his absence.
Defendant argues that sentencing cannot proceed, even though a defendant
may be voluntarily absent, unless he has been warned that he can be sentenced in
absentia. See Br. Aplt. at 14. Defendant asserts that a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the right to presence is not possible without a warning. See id.
Defendant did not make this claim below, either at the sentencing hearing or
in his motion to correct an illegal sentence. See R. 41-42, 64:2-3. Defendant
merely claimed that sentencing should not proceed in his absence (1) because he
was entitled to make a statement and (2) because the court did not know the reason
for his absence. See id. Defendant's claim that a warning must precede sentencing
in absentia was not raised with sufficient specificity to bring that error "to the trial
court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the error[] if
appropriate." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Ut. App. 1993); see also State v.
Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989); State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099
(Ut. App. 1991). Defendant therefore failed to preserve this claim.
As defendant does not argue plain error in his opening brief or assert any
other exception to the preservation requirement, his claim is not subject to review.
See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995); State v. Johnson, 114
P.2dat 1144-45.
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In any event, defendant's argument is not supported by Utah law or by sound
policy considerations. Should this court accept defendant's argument it would, in
effect, impose an affirmative duty on trial courts accepting guilty pleas or entering
guilty verdicts to warn all unincarcerated defendants of the possibility of sentencing
in absentia. Failure to give the warning would preclude imposition of sentence
whenever defendants chose not to appear.
Anderson details the Utah law controlling waiver of the right to presence.
Under Anderson, voluntary absence—absence after notice where the defendant is
free to attend in the sense that he is not incarcerated elsewhere—effects a waiver.
"[A] defendant not accused of a capital crime waives his right to be present at
sentencing by voluntary absence." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. No warning is
required.4

4

Defendant attempts to distinguish Anderson, arguing that no warning was required
because of its unique procedural posture. The court, however, never entertained the
possibility that a warning might be required. Rather, the Anderson court explained how,
under the unique circumstances surrounding the case, sentencing was permissible without
actual notice to defendant.
The propriety of sentencing in absentia arose in the trial court after Anderson
moved for permission to leave the state to visit his parents. The court granted his motion
upon Anderson's written and oral agreement to be tried in absentia should he fail to
appear for trial. Anderson failed to appear and was tried and sentenced in his absence.
On appeal Anderson admitted waiving his right to be present a trial, but objected
to his sentencing in absentia. He argued that the sentencing procedure violated his rights
to due process and to allocution. On review, the Utah Supreme Court held that he had
voluntarily absented himself and waived his right to be present at sentencing. After
explaining that a defendant must generally have notice and be free from custody, the court
held that Anderson, who did not have notice of the sentencing proceeding, had
nevertheless waived his right to presence by his voluntary absence. The court found that
13

The Anderson holding relied on and is consistent with the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rule 22(b) states: "On the same grounds that a defendant may
be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's
absence." Rule 17(a)(2) details those grounds: in non-capital cases, "the
defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present."
Neither Anderson nor the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure make waiver
contingent on defendant's having been warned that he may be tried in his absence.
Further, public policy considerations militate against requiring a warning.
Anderson explains some of the practical considerations that favor sentencing
in absentia. These include the possibility that "a defendant might. . . absent himself
for years," during which a judge might go on to other assignments or retire, trial
records could be lost or destroyed, victims might move, or trial counsel could die.
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. At the very least, "it would be a waste of judicial
resources to repeat a sentencing hearing simply due to [a] defendant's caprice." Id.
The result defendant seeks, i.e., a ruling that sentencing cannot proceed for
lack of warning, could force the trial courts to deal with every one of the practical

Anderson's lack of notice was attributable to his own misconduct. "Had he maintained
contact with pretrial services and with his attorney, as was his duty, he would have known
of the sentencing date." 929 P.2d at 1111.
14

problems that Anderson sets forth. Should a court inadvertently fail to give a
required warning, a defendant could simply choose not to attend—for whatever
reason—and thereby foreclose, at least until his apprehension, further proceedings in
the court.
Defendant argues for a warning requirement relying on United States v.
McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1969),5 a case effectively overruled by
Taylor v. United States (Taylor II), 414 U.S. 17 (1973). McPherson, who was
released on bail during trial and failed to return, was tried in absentia. On appeal,
the appellate court reversed, holding that McPherson may not have intentionally
relinquished his right to be present, testify, and confront the witnesses against him.
Because he had not been warned that trial could continue without him, the court
vacated the judgment and remanded for a determination of whether McPherson
knew in fact that trial could go on without him. 421 F.2d at 1130-31.
The dissent argued that the issue was not whether McPherson knew that trial
could proceed in his absence, but whether he knew he had a right to be present and
waived it. In United States v. Taylor (Taylor I), 478 F.2d 689 (1 st Cir.) (aff'd, 414
U.S. 17 (1973)), also a case where the defendant absented himself mid-trial, the
appellate court adopted the reasoning of the McPherson dissent. If a "defendant

5

Defendant argues that Anderson's reliance on McPherson requires that defendant
be given notice, or warned, that sentencing will occur even if he does not appear. Br.
Aplt. at 8. Anderson, however, merely relied on McPherson for the proposition that a
"defendant must have notice of proceedings." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110.
15

knew or should have known that he had a right to be present, his voluntary
absence . . . [is] a waiver of that known right." Id. at 691 (internal quotation marks
omitted). No warning that sentencing will continue in a defendant's absence is
necessary because "[t]he very statement that a trial will continue or commence at a
fixed time, when coupled with knowledge of one's right to be present at trial,
implies that the continuation of the trial, at least in non-capital cases, does not
depend on his presence." Id.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Taylor and affirmed.
The Supreme Court, like First Circuit Court of Appeals, rejected Taylor's argument
that "his mere voluntary absence from his trial [could not] be construed as an
effective waiver . . . unless it is demonstrated that he knew or had been expressly
warned by the trial court not only that he had a right to be present but also that the
trial would continue in his absence." Taylor II, 414 U.S. at 19. Like the court
below, the Supreme Court found that the issue was "the right to be present" and that
"that right was effectively waived by [the defendant's] voluntary absence." Id. at
20. The Court determined that no warning was required and reiterated that "a trial
may not be defeated by conduct of the accused that prevents the trial from going
forward." Id. The Supreme Court's opinion follows the reasoning of Taylor I and
rejects the analysis of the McPherson majority. Defendant's reliance on McPherson
is therefore unavailing.

16

Defendant also relies on Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255 (1993), a more
recent United States Supreme Court case that interprets Rule 43 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Crosby, the Court held that Rule 43, a more
restrictive rule than its Utah counterpart, proscribes the commencement of a trial in
a defendant's absence. The Court noted that Rule 43 permits the continuance, but
not the commencement, of a trial in a defendant's absence. The case was decided
on the basis of statute and did not reach any constitutional claim. The case did not
address a warning requirement and does not support defendant's argument that
warning is required.
Crosby and Taylor are both consistent with the current version of Rule 43 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. While the rule requires a defendant's
presence at the commencement of trial, the right to presence may be waived by
absence during the continuation of trial and at sentencing:
The further progress of the trial to and including the return of the
verdict, and the imposition of sentence, will not be prevented and the
defendant will be considered to have waived the right to be present
whenever a defendant, initially present at trial, or having pleaded guilty
or nolo contendere,
(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced (whether or
not the defendant has been informed by the court of the obligation to
remain during trial),
(2) in a noncapital case, is voluntarily absent at the imposition of
sentence, or
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(3) after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct will
cause the removal of the defendant from the courtroom, persists in
conduct which is such as to justify exclusion from the courtroom.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b).
The federal rule therefore permits sentencing in absentia where a defendant
has pleaded guilty and then voluntarily absents himself from sentencing. While the
rule requires a warning to disruptive defendants, it requires no warning that
sentencing will proceed if the defendant voluntarily absents himself. The advisory
committee notes explain that the rationale behind the rule. "Delay in conducting the
sentencing hearing [when a defendant voluntarily flees before sentence is imposed]
may result in difficulty later in gathering and presenting the evidence necessary to
formulate a guideline sentence."6 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 advisory committee's
notes (1995 amendment). The rationale also supports Utah law permitting
sentencing in absentia where a defendant voluntarily absents himself—the law set
forth in Anderson and Rules 17 and 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

6

Rule 43, as currently codified, permits sentencing, but not commencement of a
trial, in a defendant's absence. The rule undermines defendant's argument that presence
is more important at sentencing than at trial. See Br. Aplt. at 10. The federal cases cited
by defendant in support of this argument interpreted a former version of Rule 43.
Compare United States v. Lastra, 973 F.2d 952, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and United States
v. Turner, 532 F. Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D. Ca. 1982) (both cited by defendant) with
United States v. Jordan, 216 F.3d 1248, 1249-50 (11th Cir. 2000) and United States v.
DiPrima, 165 F.R.D. 61 (E.D. Va. 1996) (both interpreting Rule 43 as amended in 1995).
Their holdings are inconsistent with the current version of the rule, and their statements of
policy support a position that was rejected when the rule was amended.
18

In sum, Utah law permits the trial court to sentence in absentia a defendant
who is voluntarily absent from sentencing. Where a defendant has notice of the
proceeding, is not incarcerated, and is therefore free to attend, but does not, the
court may proceed to sentencing. Defendant, by his voluntary absence, waives his
right to be present. Defendant need not be warned that sentencing will proceed in
his absence. The governmental prerogative to proceed with a trial, including
sentencing, "may not be defeated by conduct of the accused that prevents the trial
from going forward." Taylor II, 414 U.S. at 20.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on April / I , 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General/^
I

'JEANNE B. INOUYE
distant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM

THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. JON DONALD HAMLING
CASE NUMBER 001909844 State Felony
CHARGES
Charge 1 - 58-37-8(2AI) - ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended)
Attributes: Drug Schedule 2.
Class A Misdemeanor Plea: June 15, 2000 Guilty
Disposition: June 15, 2000 {Guilty Plea}
Charge 2 - 58-37-8(2AI) - ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE
Class B Misdemeanor
Disposition: June 15, 2000 Dismissed
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
J. DENNIS FREDERICK
PARTIES
Defendant - JON DONALD HAMLING
Represented by: NISA J SISNEROS
Plaintiff- STATE OF UTAH
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: JON DONALD HAMLING
Offense tracking number: 10951374
Date of Birth: January 06, 1962
Jail Booking Number: 10951374
Law Enforcement Agency: COUNTY SHERIFF
LEA Case Number: 00-63155
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY
Agency Case Number: DAO 00010444
Sheriff Office Number: 113642
Violation Date: May 19, 2000 1457 W ATHERTON DR
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TRUST TOTALS Trust Due:
200.00
Amount Paid:
0.00
Credit:
0.00
Trust Balance Due:
200.00
Balance Payable:
0.00
TRUST DETAIL
Printed: 04/04/0115:11:57

Page 1

CASE NUMBER 001909844 State Felony
Trust Description: Attorney Fees
Recipient: LDA
Amount Due:
200.00
Paid In:
0.00
Paid Out:
0.00
CASE NOTE
*failed to appear for snt 8/4/00, sentenced in absentia*
PROCEEDINGS
06-07-00 Case filed by ryans
ryans
06-07-00 Note: CASE FILED BY DET BAILESS, SLCO SHERIFF'S OFFICE. DEF IN
JAIL, WARRANT FAXED.
ryans
06-08-00 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on June 09, 2000 at 09:30 AM in
Arraignment Jail with Judge ARRAIGNMENT.
caroleo
06-08-00 Judge ARRAIGNMENT assigned
caroleo
06-09-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for Appointment of Counsel
barbarrs
Judge: ANNBOYDEN
PRESENT
Clerk: barbarrs
Defendant
Video
Tape Number:

270 Tape Count: 394

INITIAL APPEARANCE
The Information is read.
Defendant is arraigned.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints Legal Defender
Office to represent the defendant.
Appointed Counsel:
Name: Legal Defender Office
City:
Phone:
ROLL CALL is scheduled.
Date: 06/15/2000
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: To Be Determined
Third District Court
450 South State
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Printed: 04/04/01 15:12:00
Page 2

CASE NUMBER 001909844 State Felony
Before Judge: ANTHONY B. QUINN
06-09-00 ROLL CALL scheduled on June 15, 2000 at 09:00 AM in To Be
Determined with Judge QUINN.
barbarrs
06-09-00 Note: Bail remain $5,000.00
connieg
06-09-00 Filed: Affidavit of Indigency - Judge Boyden denied appointment
of LDA
connieg
06-13-00 Filed: APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL
amberh
06-13-00 Filed: FORMAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO RULE 16 OF THE
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
amberh
06-15-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for Change of Plea
jillenew
Judge: ANTHONY B. QUINN
PRESENT
Clerk: jillenew
Prosecutor: MORGAN, B. KENT
Defendant
Defendant's Attomey(s): SISNEROS, NISA J
Audio
Tape Number:

253 Tape Count: 245

Court advises defendant ofrightsand penalties.
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered.
The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence report.
Change of Plea Note
Deft signed waiver of rights.
Deft to be released to PTS will all conditions.
CASE BOUNDOVER
Defendant waived preliminary hearing, State consenting thereto.
This case is bound over. A Sentencing has been set on 8/4/00 at
08:30 AM in courtroomN41 before Judge J. DENNIS FREDERICK.
06-15-00 Judge FREDERICK assigned
jillenew
06-15-00 SENTENCING scheduled on August 04, 2000 at 08:30 AM in Fourth
Floor - N41 with Judge FREDERICK.
jillenew
06-15-00 Note: Case Bound Over
jillenew
06-20-00 Filed: Supervised Release Agreement
marleneb
08-04-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK
PRESENT
Clerk: cindyb
Prosecutor: BOWN, GREGORY L.
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): SISNEROS, NISA J

Video
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:43-9:47
Printed: 04/04/01 15:12:10
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cindyb

CASE NUMBER 001909844 State Felony
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE
OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s)
Commitment is to begin immediately.
Credit is granted for 28 day(s) previously served
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $200.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: LDA
The Court finds the defendant has voluntarily absented himself from
the sentencing proceedings. The Court orders defendant be committed
forthwith upon his arrest on this Court's warrant. Counsel for the State to prepare the findings of fact
and conclusions of law and order re absentia.
08-07-00 Note: Party 3923459 DEF
Custody changedfromPre-Trial Services
Location changedfromNONE
cindyb
08-07-00 Trust Account created
Total Due:
200.00
cindyb
08-07-00 Notice - WARRANT for Case 001909844 ED 655411
cindyb
08-07-00 Warrant ordered on: August 07, 2000 Warrant Num 972120104 No
Bail
cindyb
08-07-00 Warrant issued on: August 07, 2000 Warrant Num: 972120104 No
Bail
cindyb
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Issue reason: Failure to Appear.
08-09-00 Judgment #1 Entered
theresab
08-09-00 Filed judgment: Criminal Sentence, Judgment, Commitment @J theresab
Judge jfrederi
Signed August 04, 2000
08-09-00 Filed order: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (re
absentia)
cindyb
Judge jfrederi
Signed August 09, 2000
08-10-00 Filed: Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence
rhondam
08-16-00 Filed: Response to Defendants Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence
rhondam
08-30-00 Filed order: M/E Ruling - Deft's Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence is denied for the reasons specified in the opposing
memorandum.
cindyb
Judge jfrederi
Signed August 30, 2000
08-31 -00 Filed: Notice of Appeal
rhondam
Printed: 04/04/01 15:12:10
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CASE NUMBER 001909844 State Felony
08-31 -00 Filed: Designation of Record
rhondam
08-31 -00 Filed: Certificate
rhondam
08-31-00 Filed: Request for Transcript
rhondam
09-19-00 Filed: Notice of Filing of Transcript (Plea hearing 6/15/00 and
Sentencing 08/04/00)
kathys
09-19-00 Filed: Reporter's Transcript - Plea Hearing on 06/15/00
kathys
09-19-00 Filed: Reporter's Transcript - Sentencing 08/04/00
kathys
09-20-00 Note: Cert, copies forwarded to Court of Appeals: Notice of
Appeal, Designation of Record, Certificate, Request for
Transcript, Transcript Request/Billing Statement
kathys
09-22-00 Filed: Court of Appeals letter to Nisa J. Sisneros (COA #
20000813-CA) - Notice of Appeal filed with Court of Appeals kathys
10-11-00 Note: *Faxed copy of "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" to Salt
Lake County Jail and Utah County Jail. Clerk was advised the
defendant is in Utah County Jail.*
cindyb
10-17-00 Warrant recalled on: October 17, 2000 Warrant num 972120104 kimbers
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was
booked.
10-17-00 Note: File referred to Judge Frederick's clerk, deft in jail mirandab
10-17-00 Filed: Motion to Appeal Sentence (treated as a Notice of
Appeal)
sophieo
10-17-00 Note: Index/Record: (File-1, Trans-2) taken up to Court of
Appeals - Coa#20000813-ca
sophieo
10-17-00 Note: *Faxed copy of "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" to the
Salt Lake County Jail (ADC). Defendant was booked on 10/16/00. *cindyb
11 -27-00 Filed: Affidavit of Impecuniosity
rhondam
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